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RESOURCE ALLOCATION OF SUPER PACS: AN ANALYSIS OF THE 2012 
CONGRESSIONAL ELECTION CYCLE 
by 
Christina Pretorius 
University of New Hampshire, December, 2014 
 
Independent expenditure-only committees, known as super PACs, have emerged as 
substantial actors in the electoral arena. They have surpassed every other type of campaign 
organization in the 2012 election, including political parties, and have become an appealing 
alternative to traditional political action committees due to their limited restrictions. This study 
explores the characteristics of the races in which super PACs participated, which allows the 
researcher to examine the various motives of these new organizations. An analysis of the 2012 
congressional election cycle found that super PACs are sensitive to race competitiveness, 
suggesting they are interested in seat maximization, but not as a primary motivation as it is for 
political parties. Rather, they follow ideological motives, moving to elect like-minded 
candidates. Unlike some traditional political action committees, super PACs were not shown to 
pursue investment motives, where organizations trade campaign resources for the expectation of 
future reward. We conclude that super PACs are not emerging as substitutes for the party system 






…Problem-solving pragmatism is currently out of fashion. 
Actually, it’s worse than that: Politicians who try to break the 
partisan impasse risk self-immolation. A Republican who reaches 
out to Democrats on immigration or some other highly charged 
issue risks being…mauled by political goon squads with gobs of 
money, like the Club for Growth, Americans for Prosperity and 
Heritage Action. 
-Will Marshall (2014) 
 
 Money in American politics has become a source of news headlines, controversy, and 
concern within the electorate. Recent Supreme Court rulings, including Citizens United v. FEC, 
Speechnow.org v. FEC, and more recently, McCutcheon v. FEC have ruled many campaign 
finance rules and regulations unconstitutional, all but deregulating the financing of the electoral 
process. This has allowed for unprecedented amounts of money to be funneled into campaigns 
through new organizations known as super PACs. This study aims to determine the motives of 
these new political action committees, and whether they are emerging as a substitute for,  or in 
competition with the traditional party system, or if they behave more like conventional political 
action committees. I argue that their behavior is somewhat in the middle: their unparalleled war 
chests allow them to influence a large number of elections, but their motivations align more 
closely with regular PACs: to seek ideological compatibility and potential policy payoffs. More 
broadly, I argue these organizations will not become substitutes to the well-known political party 
system; their allocation strategies work in concert with parties, allowing a particular party to 
concentrate on those races that need the most attention.  
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 Fear that campaign funding fuels corruption among politicians has produced a sense of 
mistrust and indifference to politics among the American people. Record spending and a 
gridlocked Congress have only served to reinforce those fears. Research has suggested that 
money does not corrupt policymakers in the more direct quid pro quo, but citizens, journalists, 
and lawmakers remain concerned (Brennan Center for Social Justice, 2012). 
 As a result of the two landmark rulings, Citizens United and Speechnow.org, new 
independent expenditure-only political action committees—dubbed super PACs—are legally 
permitted to raise and spend unlimited amounts of money in any given election as long as the 
activities are independent of the candidates or candidates’ committees. Since the ruling, overall 
spending has increased tenfold (Follow the Unlimited Money). In the 2012 cycle alone, super 
PACs spent over $620 million in independent expenditures, accounting for about half of the 
independent expenditure spending that cycle. These expenditures have typically been spent on 
advertising, ground operations, and other campaign efforts. 
 Where do these organizations fit in the party system? They spend millions of dollars on 
electing candidates, but are legally prohibited from working directly with political parties and 
candidates. As separate entities, they are not allowed to share resources the way other types of 
political action committees are. In fact, traditional party-connected PACs are essential parts of 
the “enduring multilayer coalition.” (Herrnson, 2009) Raising over $1 billion each in the 2012 
electoral cycle, the Democratic and Republican parties work with leadership, candidates, and 
incumbents to further the parties’ missions (Center for Responsive Politics, 2014a). An 
understanding of super PAC behavior is important in providing insights into their role in the 
enduring multilayered coalition and, as a result, in elections.  
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 This study furthers the empirical knowledge of interest group behavior, particularly of 
super PAC behavior. A thorough study of independent expenditures in the 2012 congressional 
election cycle provides a better understanding of how these organizations allocate their 
resources, and highlights the overall spending patterns in the election.  
I find that super PACs, while rationally allocating their resources to races in which they 
can make the most impact, are less bound to strategic division of funds than party organizations. 
My research suggests that while these PACs can work closely and in a similar fashion to other 
types of organizations within the party system, they are largely independent entities that work to 
follow their own agendas. Super PACs tended to participate more heavily in districts that were 
slightly competitive and relatively depolarized. While there are significant relationships between 
super PAC participation in races and competitiveness of the race, the relationships were not as 
substantial as those between competitiveness and party spending, suggesting that super PACs are 
not competitors to the traditional party organization. Indeed, they behave like traditional PACs in 
that they tend to participate in less competitive races with a less polarized political climate, 
suggesting that they are motivated by seat gains but are also motivated by ideological concerns. 
Because there are no limits to contributions to these new types of organizations, wealthy donors 
and the political elite are often their main funders, and therefore have a strong influence on the 
policy and ideological preferences of the groups. The mix of motivations—seat gains and 
ideological concerns—could make for a potentially polarized Congress skewed to the wealthiest 




Chapter 1: The History of Campaign Finance Reform and the Rise 
of the Super PAC 
Money in politics is a widely contested phenomenon. Today, billions of dollars are spent 
on federal campaigns for office and creating skepticism among voters—concern over corruption, 
buying votes, and extremism, particularly in the age of the Super PAC (Center for Responsive 
Politics, 2014a) (Brennan Center for Social Justice, 2012). However, before analyzing the role of 
money in elections, it is important to understand the background of campaign finance. 
Campaign spending, traditionally on behalf of candidate committees and party 
committees, has been the source of debate, research, and controversy before the founding of the 
United States. George Washington, during his election for the Virginia House of Burgesses in 
1757, was the focus of negative attention when he spent close to $200 on cider, rum, and other 
spirits during his election season. With the expansion of the electorate in the nineteenth century 
and the rise of political parties, wealthy donors were expected to contribute to candidates’ 
elections, which expanded fears of corruption and purchased elections. Though individual states 
regulated campaign spending through state statutes, it was not until 1907 that the United States 
prohibited contributions from corporations and national banks through the Tillman Act, and 1910 
that the United States enacted a federal disclosure requirement for campaign contributions 
(Potter & Morgan, 2013).  
These disclosure requirements were reformed, resulting in the Federal Corrupt Practices 
Act of 1925 and largely remained unchanged until 1972, when Congress passed the Federal 
Election Campaign Act (FECA), setting up the standards for reporting, disclosure, and campaign 
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contribution limits that are in place today (Federal Election Commission). It also loosely defined 
the committees that are now known as Political Action Committees (PACs), as it softened the 
requirements of the Tillman Act and allowed corporations and unions to voluntarily collect 
campaign donations for a separate fund to be used in Federal elections. Congressional 
amendments to the FECA in 1974 set up the strict contribution and expenditure limits that were 
later challenged in the landmark Supreme Court case Buckley v. Valeo in 1976. The Court upheld 
the contribution limits, stating they served a governmental interest in “safeguarding the integrity 
of elections.” The limitations on expenditures were overturned (424 U.S. 1, 1976). 
The regulations on campaign contributions were in place for close to fifty years, and were 
further strengthened by the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 (Federal Election 
Commission). The act subjected political party committees to federal limits outlined by the 
Federal Election Commission and regulated electioneering communications, setting up limits to 
when they may be broadcast as well as prohibiting corporations or other entities from funding 
the ads. The latter half of the act was overturned in 2010 when the Supreme Court struck down 
corporate expenditure limits in federal elections with their ruling in Citizens United v. Federal 
Election Commission (130 U.S. 913) and removed the regulations on electioneering 
communications by corporations and labor organizations. The decision overturned several 
aspects of long-held campaign finance rules and regulations and held that limits on independent 
expenditures—expenditures for communications that “expressly advocate for the election or 
defeat of a clearly identified candidate that is not made in cooperation…with a candidate, a 
candidate’s authorized committee… or a political party” (FEC, 11 CFR 100.16(a)) by 
corporations and labor unions—were a violation of the First Amendment. In the same year, the 
U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit struck down contribution limits to 
6 
 
groups that make only independent expenditures, also citing First Amendment concerns with 
freedom of speech (Speechnow.org v. FEC, 2010). As a result of these two rulings, independent 
expenditure-only committees that could accept unlimited contributions from individuals and 
corporations and can expend unlimited amounts of money in uncoordinated communications 
were formed. These groups were termed “super PACs” by Eliza Newlin Carney, a journalist 
from the National Journal (Levinthal, 2012). Since 2010, super PACs have spent over a billion 
dollars in campaigns throughout the United States (Center for Responsive Politics, 2014b). As of 
November 2014, they have raised over $687 million and have spent over $345 million for 
congressional races in the 2014 election cycle (Center for Responsive Politics, 2014a). 
Preliminary studies of super PAC coordination with political parties have been done (Scala, 
2014). This study builds upon that work by including 2012 House elections and uses different 






Chapter 2: Campaign Finance in the Literature 
Understanding the current campaign finance landscape requires an overview of the roles 
of the various outside money organizations. Parties have played an instrumental role in 
campaigns, efficiently allocating funds to those races that need money the most in order to win 
the most seats in the chamber. To do this, they spend money and promote platforms to attract 
votes from the electorate (Grossman & Helpman, 1996). This is an important distinction:  the 
party must follow the relative trends and preferences of the broad electorate in order to be 
successful. Voters and contributors, in theory, are responsible for determining the salience and 
positions that parties take on issues.  
Traditional political action committees (PACs), on the other hand, tend to favor 
candidates who share similar policy interests and actively promote these interests. Whereas 
parties favor the outcome of the whole institution, PACs favor the outcome of a single candidate 
or a group of candidates that will likely work to the organization’s best interests. 
This distinction is important in my analysis. If super PACs are competing with parties 
and potentially becoming substitutes for the larger party organization, it may further polarize the 
legislature because many of these groups are ideologically based and often have only one or a 
few issues for which they are fighting (climate change, free markets, etc.).  In many instances, 
super PACs are well funded by the political and business elite of the country, and therefore the 
issues most important to them become the issues most important to Congress. This is in contrast 
to the party system. Parties, as mentioned earlier, strategically campaign in order to maximize 
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votes, so they must cater to the broader electorate. However, if they are acting in similar ways to 
the traditional PAC organizations where they do not necessarily look to gain seats, but rather 
support those who may have an advantage or are in a “safe” race, the super PAC money may not 
swing elections as much as some analysts fear.   
Why Parties? 
Party organizations play a vital role in elections: efficiently allocating funds to races 
which will benefit most from investment. Independently, candidates can raise and spend money 
for their own campaigns, but for effective policymaking, their interests extend beyond simply 
getting elected—they must also have a coalition of colleagues with similar goals in order to 
advance their policy directives (Jacobson G. C., 1985). Here, the party serves two functions: to 
provide a political institution to facilitate compromise between factions of politicians in order to 
further policy goals, and to allocate resources to elect these politicians (Levy, 2004). Politicians’ 
individual goals—reelection, advancement to party leadership, and achieving good public 
policy—are served through membership in a party, particularly a majority party (Fenno, 1973) 
(Heberlig, 2003). 
 Parties have been the most dominant form of political organizing for centuries (Grossman 
& Helpman, 1996). Their resource allocation strategies have been found to be consistent between 
the parties but with subtle (and important) differences between them. Party leaders allocate 
resources based on campaign factors rather than candidates’ allegiances to the party (Damore & 
Hansford, 1999). Instead, allocation is driven by the specific race characteristics: Democrats tend 
to allocate funds more evenly than Republicans, who typically funnel the most resources to the 
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most vulnerable candidates. The latter strategy, as mentioned in the literature, leaves potentially 
winnable seats without the resources needed to run a competitive race. 
My thesis states that super PAC spending complements party spending by mediating this 
problem. Super PAC investment in these riskier seats frees up the party to allocate resources to 
vulnerable and competitive races, while they participate in races that may lean in favor of the 
opposite party. 
Political Action Committees: Motivations and Participation 
Political action committees (PACs) may have substantially varying motives when 
supporting congressional candidates. Among the various motives, PACs can pursue electoral 
motives, where they promote like-minded candidates and those who support their ideological 
preferences, or influence motives, where they support candidates that they believe have a chance 
of winning in order to influence politicians’ policy stances (Grossman & Helpman, 1996). Using 
a two-stage game theory approach, Grossman and Helpman found that PACs tend to pursue 
influence motives in which their contributions result in policy favors by the candidates they 
support. Likewise, other studies have found that these committees tend to contribute to 
candidates in districts that do not have constituencies with strong interests in the agendas that the 
PACs support, while they contribute less to candidates in which PAC and constituency interests 
are aligned (Stratmann, 2005). In those districts where candidates’ constituencies have 
preferences aligned with those of the PACs, the contributions would be ineffective since the 
candidate would vote with his or her constituency anyway. However, in those districts where the 




 While scholars disagree on policy motives for PAC spending, there have been recognized 
benefits of interest group spending for the constituencies of districts that have PAC involvement. 
Coate argues that political interest groups favor electoral motives and are beneficial to the 
electoral process, as they produce more informed choices among the electorate (Coate, 2004). In 
a more recent study, Prato and Wolton also used a game theory approach to find that increased 
spending by interest groups is beneficial to voters as it increases issue knowledge during the 
election, but can draw away from the pressure to act in constituents’ best interests in the long 






Chapter 3: Terms and Definitions  
 The purpose of this study is to examine the characteristics of the races that attract 
spending by various political actors. The Federal Election Commission (FEC), the regulatory 
agency responsible for the disclosure of campaign finance information and enforcement of 
federal election law as prescribed by the United States Congress, publishes data related to federal 
elections (About the FEC, 2014).This study uses FEC definitions for all terms, including the 
definition of political actors.  
 There are several important distinctions in campaign communications and spending in 
federal elections. Communications explicitly endorsing a candidate are regulated by the FEC, 
and have historically been prohibited by organizations other than candidate committees, party 
committees, and political action committees. A communication explicitly endorses a candidate 
when it clearly urges the recipient of the message to elect or defeat a clearly identified candidate. 
Organizations that are prohibited from making coordinated communications include corporations 
and labor organizations. Independent expenditures, on the other hand, are those expenditures that 
are used (usually for communications) that expressly advocate for the defeat or election of a 
clearly identified candidate and are not made in cooperation or in concert with a candidate, 
candidate’s committee, or party. These expenditures are made completely independently of the 
candidate’s campaign (Coordinated Communications and Independent Expenditures, 2014).  
 This analysis is principally concerned with the behavior of independent expenditure-only 
committees, or super PACs, as designated by the FEC. These organizations exist solely to raise 
money and spend it in the form of independent expenditures. They are also unique in that they 
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are permitted to accept funds from corporate or union treasuries in unlimited amounts (Sunlight 
Foundation, 2014).  
 Other types of political action committees exist and are regulated by the FEC. These 
entities, referred to in this analysis as “traditional PACs,” have restrictions on the contribution 
amounts from individuals and organizations, unlike super PACs. Also, they are prohibited from 
accepting funds from union and corporate treasuries: a corporation that would like to form a 
traditional PAC must fully fund it from donations specifically intended for political use (Sunlight 
Foundation, 2014). 
 Political nonprofit organizations, commonly referred to as 501(c) organizations, report to 
the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) rather than the FEC. These organizations are considered 
nonprofit entities, and as such do not have to disclose their donors. Their spending is restricted 
by the IRS tax code: the majority of their operations must not be political; many are involved in 
research and voter education initiatives. However, they are permitted to donate to super PACs in 
unlimited amounts. This has created some controversy in campaign finance law, as all 
organizations under FEC regulation must disclose their donors. Super PACs create a large 
loophole: donors may anonymously donate to political nonprofits, who then may funnel the 
money into super PACs. This gave donors the ability to participate in elections while skirting the 
disclosure requirement (Barker, 2011). 
 The organization types in this analysis were designated by the FEC records. Each 
independent expenditure record included the organization identification number, as well as the 
committee designation. Other data, including the candidate for whom the expenditure was 
intended, congressional district or state of the race, date of expenditure, and expenditure amount 
were also published by the FEC.  
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 District characteristics used in this study were race competitiveness, incumbency status, 
and level of state polarization. Race competitiveness refers to the narrowness of the margin of 
expected victory; i.e., the vote shares are expected to be close to equal. This analysis used the 
Rothenberg Ratings, published by acclaimed political analyst Stuart Rothenberg, as a measure of 
competitiveness. Rothenberg uses a complex methodology to determine race competitiveness, 
which includes survey polling results, district demographics and history, and other qualitative 
factors (including interviews with campaign managers, journalists, and other political insiders) 
(Rothenberg, 2014).  
Race competitiveness was a proxy for determining whether super PACs pursued seat 
maximization motives and is defined as the desire to acquire as many seats in either chamber as 
possible for a particular party, whether through protecting incumbents or gaining new seats 
(Jacobson & Kernell, Winter, 1985-1986). Competitiveness is an appropriate measure for seat 
maximization because organizations interested in gaining seats will rationally allocate resources 
to those races in which they have the greatest chance of winning new seats: those where the 
margin of victory is small enough to overcome the opposing party. Likewise, limited resources 
force organizations interested in seat maximization to allocate funds away from less competitive 
races—whether they are expected to be easy wins or hopeless losses.  
 Incumbency status was determined by FEC records. The FEC publishes candidate 
information, including whether the candidate is running for reelection. Polarization refers to the 
distance between party medians as portrayed in the Ideological Mapping of American 
Legislatures. This index measures the ideological difference between the two parties in the state 
legislature: in depolarized chambers, Democrats and Republicans are close on the liberal-
conservative scale. In very conservative states, Democrats may be more conservative than the 
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national average, and vice versa. Likewise, in highly polarized chambers, Democrats and 
Republicans represent ideological extremes, where Democrats tend to be very liberal and 
Republicans very conservative. These two measures were proxies for ideological and investment 
motives. Investment motives are those motives that drive a committee to campaign on behalf of a 
candidate with the expectation of future reward, in the form of policy favors, policy consultation, 
or goodwill by the candidate to the committee (Gordon, Hafer, & Landa, 2007). Ideological 
motives are defined as a committee’s desire to elect like-minded candidates who have similar 
policy interests and goals as the committee. While sometimes thought of as “consumption,” 
where the committee exists purely as a political participant, ideological motives may also exist as 
a way for a committee to indirectly have policy influence. However, in contrast with more direct 
investment motives, the goals of electing ideologically like-minded individuals are often not 
interpreted as corruption.  
 Polarization and incumbency status are appropriate proxies for measuring ideological 
motives. Polarization, particularly the measure used in this study, is a useful measurement of the 
overall state mood and ideology: the index captures states that heavily lean in one ideological 
way or another or have a conflicted dual-ideological political climate (Shor & McCarty, 
Ideological Mapping of American Legislatures, 2011). It is an underlying assumption of this 
analysis that states that are moderately polarized are more likely to elect moderate candidates, 
which would therefore have a less challenging time advocating for policy payoffs for those 
committees that sponsored their election campaigns. Likewise, it is my assumption that 
extremely depolarized and extremely polarized political climates will produce ideologically 
extreme candidates: extremely polarized climates may have fewer undecided voters, and 
candidates would have to appeal to their bases to encourage voters to vote for them, opening up 
15 
 
the door for more extreme ideological positions. In depolarized political climates, there is little 
ideological difference between Democrats and Republicans: Republicans in a depolarized state 
would be more liberal than the average Republican and perhaps more liberal than some 
Democrats in other states. Because the entire ideological median is shifted to one ideology, 
candidates that lie to the outer limits have a better chance of election than those in more 
moderate climates. Elizabeth Warren’s campaign in 2012 for the Massachusetts Senate seat is an 
example: the state, which is relatively depolarized in favor of Democrats, elected a candidate not 
only further left than her predecessor, Scott Brown, but also one of the most prominent liberal 
senators in the chamber (Enten, 2014). 
 Committees interested in ideological motives, therefore, would be driven to campaign in 
states where the climate favors their views, especially if they are more radical than the political 
norms. Committees interested in investment motives, on the other hand, may be more successful 
campaigning on behalf of incumbents who already have established relationships within 
Congress, and who hold moderate views that would be more likely to be accepted by other 






Chapter 4: Campaign Finance in the 2012 Election 
The 2012 election was the first full election cycle of the Citizens United v. FEC and 
Speechnow.org v. FEC decisions. As seen in Figure 1, the ruling resulted in sharp increases in 
the amounts of independent expenditures spent by non-party organizations and committees in the 
U.S. House and Senate races. There was over a sixfold increase in Senate election spending 
alone between 2008 and 2012—100 times higher than the increase in health insurance premiums 
between 2007 and 2008 (Pricewaterhouse Cooper, 2008). However, whereas the sharp rise in 
insurance costs became a central political issue in recent elections, campaign spending has 
received substantially less attention.  
























Source: Brookings Institute, 2013 
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The amount spent in independent expenditures has been relatively low since 1978 (not 
shown). Until about 2008, independent expenditures totaled less than $10 million per chamber 
per cycle. The amount of spending in House elections began to increase slightly in 2006 and 
2008, but rapidly increased in 2010 and 2012 as a result of the Citizens United and 
Speechnow.org decisions. The 2010 election cycle did not have the full effect of the rulings due 
to their release in the beginning of summer, when campaign spending is planned and groups are 
organized. Despite the limited time to organize, over 1,300 super PACs formed and raised $828 
million, including organizations formed for presidential candidates (Center for Responsive 
Politics, 2013). 
The figure also displays the symmetry between spending for House and Senate races. 
Aside from two years (2006 and 2012), the rates of spending for each chamber remained 
remarkably similar. It shows that Senate races are more expensive than House races, which is 
consistent with the literature. However, expenditures were almost identical between chambers 
for most years in the study.  This suggests that while it is typically less expensive to run for a 
House seat, committees in general place equal emphasis on the chambers of Congress when 
considering electoral prospects.  
Super PACs surpassed both the number of organizations and amount spent in 
congressional elections in this cycle. Table 1 shows a breakdown of committees and 
organizations that reported independent expenditures with the Federal Election Commission 
(FEC). Of the 305 total organizations and $657 million in spending, 113 filed as independent 
expenditure-only committees (super PACs) which accounted for 35% of the total congressional 
expenditures. Party committees spent $25 million less, but surpassed super PAC spending when 
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taking into account the other ways that parties are allowed to spend, including direct 
contributions to candidates.  
Table 1: Spending and Number of Organizations by Committee Type, 2012 




Super PAC 113 $229,687,290 




PAC 45 43,295,641 
Hybrid PAC 12 6,386,843 




Total 305 $656,703,610 
Source: Federal Election Commission, 2014 
 
Other ‘dark money’ groups, known as political nonprofits, were substantial players in the 
2012 election. Spending about $167 million, these groups include individuals and groups that 
make independent expenditures. Some are nonprofit, social welfare organizations that have 
missions either for the express purpose of promoting political ideas, or have missions focused 
around education and activism, but also participate in advocating for or against candidates. The 
U.S. Chamber of Commerce and League of Conservation Voters are examples of independent 
expenditors—the Chamber is a lobbying group, while the LCV is a political advocacy 
organization focused on voter education (League of Conservation Voters) (Center for 
Responsive Politics, 2014c). These organizations are not required to disclose their donors, as the 
Internal Revenue Service is primarily responsible for these organizations’ reporting. 
Another newer type of organization emerged in 2011: political committees that maintain 
non-contribution accounts, also known as Hybrid PACs. These new organizations are similar to 
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super PACs in that they can raise and spend unlimited amounts of money to campaign for or 
against candidates in the form of independent expenditures—through their non-contribution 
accounts—but are also permitted to contribute directly to candidates, similar to traditional 
political action committees. These committees must have two separate bank accounts: one for 
independent expenditures and one for candidate contributions, but are managed under the same 
organization. (Federal Election Commission, 2011) This cycle, there were only 12 of these 
PACs, spending $6.3 million in independent expenditures (Federal Election Commission, 
2014c). 
 As shown in Figure 1, more independent expenditures were spent on Senate races than 
on House races in 2012. This is also true when considering the top ten committees by 
expenditures (Table 2). These committees spent approximately $195 million on Senate races and 


































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Super PACs accounted for 3 of the 10 top organizations for independent expenditure 
spending in the election and about 24% of spending within these organizations. Excluding party 
organizations, super PACs accounted for about half of the spending among these top 
organizations. Conservative-based Freedomworks for America, the largest non-party super PAC, 
spent close to $16 million in both chambers, with $10 million spent in Senate races.  
This pattern is similar in the other four organizations unaffiliated with parties—while 
parties and leadership PACs spent more money in the chamber in which they had the greatest 
momentum and chance of winning (Republicans for House seats, Democrats for Senate seats), 
other types of organizations, including Freedomworks for America, used other strategies to 
allocate their resources (Senate Prediction 2012, 2012). The US Chamber of Commerce, for 
example, traditionally endorses pro-business Republican candidates and used more than twice 
their resources in Senate elections.  Crossroads Grassroots Policy Strategies (GPS), also a 
conservative-based nonprofit organization, overwhelmingly expended their resources into Senate 
races. The electoral results paid off for the parties: Republicans kept the House with a 234-










Table 2: Chamber Spending by Organization Type and Party Affiliation, 2012 
 Senate House 
501 (c)   
Democrat  $21,742,591   $11,802,262  
Republican  76,084,104  55,770,866  
Independent  3,587,629  -- 
PAC   
Democrat  15,721,130   13,702,287  
Republican  5,648,852   8,195,500  
Party   
Democrat 52,106,522  58,652,218  
Republican  29,656,205  62,850,717  
Super PAC   
Democrat 61,013,907  70,815,306  
Republican  57,344,590  40,234,667  
Source: Federal Election Commission, 2014a 
  
Table 3 shows chamber spending by organization type and party affiliation. Nonprofit 
groups, shown as 501 (c) in the table, were overwhelmingly supportive of Republicans, 
particularly Senate Republicans. Parties, as shown in Table 3, allocated their resources 
differently—Democrats outspending Republicans in Senate races, where they were favored to 
keep seats, and Republicans outspending Democrats in House races, where their odds of taking 
seats were better than in the Senate. Super PACs were overwhelmingly supportive of Democratic 
candidates, with a small Senate advantage.  
These figures were taken from FEC filings, where spending in opposition of a candidate 
was added to the opposing party’s total. For instance, if an expenditure was made in opposition 
to a Republican candidate, that expenditure was added to the Democratic total. This limitation 
must be taken into consideration when interpreting the data, as this is generally true of most 
expenditures. However, for a few organizations, expenditures in opposition to a candidate may in 
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fact be intended to support a candidate of the same party but different on the ideological scale. I 
do not differentiate these groups in this analysis because all expenditures included in the analysis 
are from the general elections and therefore—aside from several elections—conventional 
wisdom dictates that there is a single candidate from each party on the ballot, and spending in 
opposition of one candidate is advantageous to the opposing party.  
 
Table 3: Expenditures by Organization Type and Race, 2012 

















14,384,217 Ohio Senate 3,106,626 Nevada 
Senate 
8,327,247 























1,599,913 ND Senate 7,055,759 
Florida’s 18th  
District 
6,849,322 Iowa’s 4th 
District 














5,781,864 Illinois’ 11th 
District 
1,258,189 Arizona’s 1st 
District 
4,478,028 
Total 101,517,688  22,558,962  80,661,014 
Super PAC refers to spending on behalf of independent expenditure-only committees 
PACs are those political action committees designated by the FEC and are not part of 
party or authorized candidate committees 
Party refers to spending on behalf of either official party structure at the national level 




Resource allocation is a telling sign of committee strategy and intent. Table 4 shows 
committee spending by type and race/district. Parties invested in tight races in order to get 
greater returns and to further their goal of seat maximization (Damore & Hansford, 1999). 
Parties contributed over $10 million in each of the Virginia and Wisconsin Senate races, which 
were considered ‘tossup’ races by the Cook Political Report and the New York Times in the 
several months leading up to the races, and were deemed among the races that would decide 
party control by the University of Virginia’s Center for Politics (Ballotpedia, 2012b; Ballotpedia, 
2012c). 
Nonprofits and PACs followed similar strategies by investing in competitive races. 
However, super PACs followed a bit of a different strategy: though they also invested in close 
races, the top 10 races by expenditure looked very different. The Florida Senate race saw the 
most super PAC activity, which although a fairly competitive race, the Democratic Party held a 
lead in polls and in ratings throughout the entire race (Ballotpedia, 2012a). Three House races 
also saw substantial super PAC involvement—FL-18, IL-08, and CA-35 had over $5 million in 
spending each. These races were relatively safe races, with Florida’s House race rated as “lean,” 
the Illinois race rated as “safe”, and the California race being between two Democrats (The 
Rothenberg Political Report, 2012). 
Super PACs also differed from parties in their resource density. Close to half of super 
PAC spending was allocated in ten races, while only 40% of party spending was allocated to the 
top ten races. This pattern was also consistent in nonprofit and PAC spending, suggesting that 
super PACs tended to allocate their resources independent of parties and with different motives.  
 Super PACs, then, seem to be very different types of organizations that do not fit in the 
traditional party mold. They accounted for one-third of the top ten committees and 35% of 
25 
 
overall independent expenditures—a huge feat, considering the limited time they had to form and 
grow as organizations. Unlike parties, they did not appear to pursue seat maximization goals, nor 
did they spread resources. They invested in similar races, but took more chances on “safe” races 
than parties, PACs, or nonprofits. This then leads to my main research question: how do super 
PACs fit in the party system? I explore this question with several hypotheses focused around 
interest group behavior and use them to develop conclusions on super PAC motivations and 
interests, as well as offer an empirical analysis to the research question.  
For this study, I am interested in races that attract super PAC spending and how they may 
differ from other races where other types of organizations, including the national party 
organizations, participate. Understanding these patterns can help us determine the motives of 
these new organizations and whether they may unlock a new form of political participation: 
unlimited direct advocacy. I find that super PACs differ from other organization types—
particularly parties—in several key ways. First, there are more districts with heavy super PAC 
investment than any other type of organization: parties, nonprofits, and traditional PACs. Fifty-
six races had super PAC expenditures over $1 million, while only 11 races had that kind of 
investment from traditional PACs. They tended to invest in safer races than parties, which could 
signal two different phenomena: they are driven by different motives and allocate their resources 
differently, or they are more effective in campaigning and are therefore able to shift the race 
from a competitive index to a safer index (or, in the case where they are campaigning against a 
frontrunner, shifting the race from safe to competitive).  
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Resource Allocation: Differences in Organization Type 
 Parties, further confirming the scholarly findings, allocated most of their resources to the 
most competitive races. To determine the allocation strategies of super PACs, we used an index 
created from the competitiveness rankings of the races from the Rothenberg Political Report. The 
competitiveness index was calculated using three Rothenberg Political Ratings spaced out during 
the general election: late August, at the very beginning of the general election, early October, and 
the first week of November immediately preceding Election Day. Races were ranked from 0 to 4, 
with 0 being ‘toss-up’ and 4 being ‘safe.’ These three rankings were summed to create a single 
index from 0 to 12. In a race with a score of 0, the race was considered a tossup the entire race. A 
race that scored between 4 and 8 remained relatively competitive and usually moved in ratings, 
while those with higher scores remained safe seats the entire election.  
An analysis of the expenditures showed that the 50 races where party spending totaled 
more than $1 million, the average competitiveness index was 3.4—meaning that during most 
weeks of the index, the races were considered “tossup” or “lean”. Likewise, there was a large 
range of polarization indexes among these races: while the average polarization index (1.85) was 
close to the model’s median of 1.5, there was a large standard deviation (0.65). This means that 
there were no real patterns in the polarization indexes for the races in which parties contributed, 
suggesting that overall political climate did not play a significant role in their allocation 
strategies. All but five races had an incumbent running for reelection. This further supports the 
literature’s assertion that parties’ strategic decisions are based on race competitiveness and seat 
maximization rather than ideological concerns.  
 In the races where parties contributed the most, super PACs were not as active as 
measured by the proportion of money spent. In the vast majority of these races, super PAC 
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expenditures accounted for less than 40% of total spending, indicating that on average, parties 
and super PACs tend to allocate resources to different races.  
 Of the 38 races where super PACs accounted for 90% or more of total independent 
expenditure spending during the general election, the vast majority were considered “safe” races 
throughout the cycle. While some races had minimal spending—less than $10,000—half spent 
over $100,000. These races are shown in Table 5. There were a substantial number of races in 
which super PACs were the only outside players in the election, in stark contrast to parties, 
where there were only eight races in which parties accounted for 90% or more of spending. This 
supports the theory that super PACs may allocate resources as an extension to the party system, 
rather than in competition with it. 
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Rating Polar. Index Incumbent 
Prop. Super PAC 
Spending 
LA-S $         168.42 12 0.701 No 100% 
NJ-05 1,071.63 12 1.052 Yes 99% 
NJ-04 1,071.64 12 1.052 Yes 99% 
KY-S 1,170.00 12 1.385 No 100% 
NY-20 1,500.00 12 1.352 Yes 100% 
FL-08 1,614.56 12 1.628 Yes 100% 
IA-S 2,000.00 12 1.614 No 100% 
VA-09 2,394.00 12 1.546 Yes 100% 
UT-03 3,000.00 12 1.724 Yes 100% 
FL-25 3,227.78 12 1.628 Yes 100% 
WV-08 4,631.00 12 1.048 Yes 100% 
CT-07 5,000.00 12 1.26 Yes 100% 
WI-01 9,734.32 12 1.969 Yes 93% 
CA-23 12,853.77 12 3.289 Yes 100% 
WV-01 33,194.91 12 1.048 Yes 100% 
OH-10 40,336.04 12 1.73 Yes 90% 
CT-04 39,505.59 12 1.26 Yes 100% 
OH-09 63,838.50 12 1.73 Yes 100% 
IL-S 67,393.50 12 1.102 No 100% 
FL-16 73,591.86 8 1.628 Yes 92% 
CA-33 100,457.98 12 3.289 Yes 100% 
MI-03 129,370.00 12 1.964 Yes 100% 
FL-27 130,897.39 12 1.628 Yes 100% 
MN-02 151,197.11 12 1.926 Yes 100% 
RI-S 183,165.25 12 0.74 No 100% 
VA-11 210,107.40 12 1.546 Yes 100% 
CA-16 296,804.16 12 3.289 Yes 98% 
NE-02 305,872.08 12 0 Yes 100% 
TN-04 467,394.98 9 1.542 Yes 96% 
OR-04 659,132.85 12 1.778 Yes 100% 
NJ-03 742,865.09 7 1.052 Yes 90% 
NY-S 968,899.19 12 1.686 No 93% 
NJ-09 938,789.00 12 1.052 Yes 100% 
CA-39 1,066,407.09 12 3.289 Yes 100% 
CA-30 1,759,278.03 12 3.289 Yes 99% 
NE-S 5,341,238.02 9 1.392 Yes 91% 
CA-35 5,782,924.99 12 3.289 Yes 100% 
FL-18 7,613,301.13 3 1.628 Yes 90% 
Race refers to the type and location of election as indicated by State, followed by district number 
for House races and ‘S’ for Senate races.  
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Rothenberg Rating refers to the index created to measure the competitiveness of the race across 
the general election cycle; scale of 0 to 12, where 0 indicates a highly competitive ‘tossup’ race 
in the three weeks included in the index and 12 indicates a ‘safe’ race for a particular party in the 
three weeks included in the index. 
Polar. Index refers to the polarization index used to measure the ideological difference between 
two parties in the state legislature as an indicator of overall state polarization, where 0 indicates 
total depolarization and zero difference between the two parties and 3.5 indicates severe 
polarization.  
Prop. Super PAC Spending refers to the proportion of spending in the race spent by independent 
expenditure-only committees as compared to total independent expenditure spending.  






Another measurement—total amount spent—shows that super PACs tended to invest in 
less competitive races than parties. The average rating for districts that had over $1 million in 
super PAC spending was 4.6—over a point higher than the average district that had heavy party 
























Super PAC 56 4.57 7.78 1.80 (0.54) 1.83 (0.51) 
Party 
Committee 
50 3.40 5.70 1.82 (0.55) 1.85 (0.43) 
Political 
Nonprofit 
41 3.95 7.75 1.85 (0.51) 1.77 (0.38) 
Other PAC 11 1.91 8.02 1.80 (0.47) 1.88 (0.42) 
Figures outside of parentheses indicate overall index, where 0 indicates least polarized political 
climate and 3.5 indicates most polarized political climate. 1.5 is model median. Figures inside of 
parentheses indicate absolute distance from median. 
Number of Races with Over $1m Spending indicates the number of races in which the 
organization type spent over $1 million in independent expenditures as filed with the Federal 
Election Commission.  
Avg. Roth. Rating: All Races indicates the average Rothenberg Rating index (created to measure 
the competitiveness of the race across the general election cycle; scale of 0 to 12, where 0 
indicates a highly competitive ‘tossup’ race in the three weeks included in the index and 12 
indicates a ‘safe’ race for a particular party in the three weeks included in the index) of all 
districts in which the organization type participated. 
Avg. Roth. Rating: $1m+ indicates the average Rothenberg Rating index for the races in which 
the organization type spent over $1 million in independent expenditures. 
Avg. Polarization: All Races indicates the average polarization index (used to measure the 
ideological difference between two parties in the state legislature as an indicator of overall state 
polarization, where 0 indicates total depolarization and zero difference between the two parties 
and 3.5 indicates severe polarization) across the states in which the organization type 
participated.  
Avg. Polarization: $1m+ indicates the average polarization index across the states in which the 
organization type spent over $1 million in independent expenditures.   







This table shows clear differences in resource allocation among the different 
organizations, and even differences within organization types. Overall, super PACs tended to 
invest in safer races than parties, nonprofits, and other PACs. PACs, on average, participated in 
the most competitive districts, while parties allocated funds to more competitive districts. 
However, the index may also show the effectiveness of party money. They may participate in 
tight races early, and turn the race from a tossup to a race that solidly leans to one party or 
another.  
 Organization types did not differ much when allocating money based on the polarization 
index of the state. It would appear that on average, more outside money was spent in slightly 
more polarized states. Ideological polarization is strongly correlated with a partisan divide in the 
electorate, which may in turn increase voter turnout (Shor & McCarty, 2011). Organizations 
appear to exploit these ideological differences, investing in areas where voters seem to have a 
clear choice between candidates based on candidate affiliation.  
 The races where super PACs spent more than $1 million tended to be safer than the 
overall races in which they contributed as measured by the Rothenberg Ratings index. There was 
over a three-point difference between the two: those that spent more than $1 million spent in 
races with competitiveness indexes averaging about 7.78, while total super PAC expenditures 
were spent in districts that had an average rating of 4.57. This could suggest that super PACs 
tend to strategically invest money in safer races from the start, or it could mean that more super 
PAC involvement in the race could sway the race from a lower, more competitive rating to a 
higher, safer rating. This may indicate that super PAC spending is effective in solidifying leads 
for candidates, but more research is warranted. 
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 Indeed, anecdotally breaking down the index, I find that in many cases, the rating shifted 
throughout the cycle. Some races shifted from more competitive to safer, while others shifted the 
other way—presumably the shift is dependent on the nature of the race and whether the super 
PACs were campaigning for or against the favored candidate.  
Interests of Super PACs 
 Super PACs accounted for 33% of all organizations in the 2012 election cycle. As shown 
in Table 7, the majority of super PACs were ideologically-focused, while only 15% were 
associated with labor interests and 3% were associated with business interests. However, super 
























as % of 
Organization 
Interest as % 
of Super 
PACs 
Business 35 6 17% 3% 
Labor 96 33 34% 15% 
Ideological 487 174 36% 82% 
Interest Type refers to the interest of the super PAC as designated by the 
Center for Responsive Politics.  
Total Number refers to the total number of organizations of any 
designation that are associated with the interest type as designated by the 
Center for Responsive Politics.  
Number of Super PACs refers to the total number of super PACs as 
designated by the Federal Election Commission that identify as the interest 
type.  
Super PACs as % of Organization indicates the percentage of interest 
types which are super PACs as designated by the Federal Election 
Commission. 
Interest as % of Super PACs indicates the percentage of super PACs that 
are associated with each interest type.  
Source: Center for Responsive Politics, 2014, and  Federal Election 
Commission, 2014a 
 
Figure 2 below shows the amount spent in the general election cycle by organization 
interest. I found that though super PACs only accounted for slightly over one-third of 
ideologically-based organizations, they accounted for 56% of the spending in that interest group. 
Of the $192 million that was spent by ideological groups, $108 million was spent by super 
PACs.  Labor organizations were remarkably consistent: super PACs accounted for 36% of all 
labor-focused organizations, and accounted for 34% of the spending by these groups. Business 
groups, on the other hand, spent more money through other organization types rather than super 
PACs.   
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Figure 2: Total Independent Expenditure Spending by Interest Type, 2012 
 
 
Single Candidate Super PACs 
 In the 2012 cycle, there were 51 super PACs that invested in only one race. Over half of 







 $27,353,935.46   $27,730,808.44  
 $191,718,507.64  
 $1,291,168.62  
 $9,298,972.78  








Total Expenditures Super PAC Expenditures
Source: Federal Election Commission, 2014a 
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Figure 3: Amount Spent in Independent Expenditures by Single-Candidate Super PACs in 
2012 General Election 
 
  
Several PACs spent more than a million dollars in the general election cycle. The largest 
single-candidate PAC, Independence Virginia PAC, spent over $4.5 million opposing Tim Kaine 
(D-VA) in his Senate bid. The pro-Kaine PAC, Progressive USA voters, spent only $75,000 
during the race. Kaine ultimately won his reelection campaign (United States Senate, 2014). 
 These groups are different in that they are unlike the majority of the other super PACs. 
Often, the super PAC organizations are thought to be similar to other types of political action 
committees, where they strategically allocate funds. These groups, however, raise and spend 
money for one particular candidate. Traditional motives may not apply, as these groups are not 
interested in gaining majorities in the House or Senate, nor do they affiliate with business or 
labor groups. Indeed, almost half of these organizations participated in races that were 
considered ‘likely’ or ‘safe’ throughout the election cycle, and about two thirds participated in 
































Source: Federal Election Commission, 2014a 
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close races, and all but two were ideologically-driven, rather than run by labor or business 
organizations.  
These PACs appear to be a new type of campaigning machine: invested individuals can 
create their own organizations aside from the official candidate campaign and raise and spend 
money on their own terms. In 2012, they tended to participate in less competitive races where the 
state was slightly more polarized than the nation as a whole. This suggests that these 
organizations may be working not as substitutes, but as partners to political parties, where they 
participate in safer races and allow parties to allocate funds into the most competitive districts 
that need the most funding. The direct-participatory nature of these organizations warrants 
further study as these organizations grow and become more prominent stakeholders in the 






Chapter 5: Research Question and Data 
 Which races attract super PAC spending? My main research question addresses the 
correlations that exist between super PAC spending and district characteristics. From this 
question, I formulate three hypotheses: 
H1: Independent expenditure-only committees (super PACs) do not pursue seat 
maximization motives. 
H0: There is no relationship between independent expenditure-only 
committee spending and race competitiveness. 
H2:  Super PACs are principally concerned with ideological rather than 
investment motives. 
H0: There is no relationship between super PAC spending and incumbency 
and polarization level in the state, which are used as measures of 
ideological motives of spending. 
H3: Super PACs operate independently from and complementary to party 
committees. 
 H0: No relationships between competitiveness, ideology, and incumbency 
status can be determined, and therefore, no relationships between super 
PAC and party spending can be derived from the data. 
 These hypotheses will allow us to draw conclusions regarding super PAC behavior and 
implications for future elections. A better understanding of these organizations is crucial in 
projecting the future electoral landscape—will super PACs be a substitute for candidate and 
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national party organizations due to their limited restrictions? Or will they emerge as safety nets 
for the party, allowing the party to concentrate resources on competitive races while the PAC 
advocates for longshot candidates?  
 For this study, super PACs are defined as independent expenditure-only committees as 
designated by the Federal Election Commission’s records. Seat maximization refers to the 
organization’s interest in gaining as many seats as possible in a given chamber during the 
election cycle, typically by party. This may be done through preserving incumbents’ vulnerable 
seats or fighting to switch the party control of a seat. For example, the National Republican 
Senatorial Committee (NRSC) might allocate funds to protect Republican incumbent senators in 
contested races and invest in races where there is an open seat or a vulnerable Democratic 
senator.  
 Ideological motives are defined as an organization’s motivation to campaign for or 
against a candidate based on his or her policy positions or party affiliation. Investment motives 
are those that drive an organization or individual to campaign for a candidate when the 
organization or individual expects a return on their action, whether through direct policy favors, 
the expectation of good will, or any other influence on policymaking once the intended recipient 
enters office (Magee, 2002). Many times, the two motivations are similar. Some ideologically-
motivated organizations strategically campaign for or against candidates with the expectation 
that once in office, the favored candidate will deliver on campaign promises, while the latter 
motive is a more direct—and perhaps more tangible—strategy. Both theoretically achieve the 
same means of policy benefits for the investing organization. 
 My third hypothesis, independent and complementary operations, is tested based on 
conclusions derived from the previous two analyses. Independent operations are operations that 
40 
 
are not done in concert with another organization—in this case, party committees. Super PAC 
operations are independent when their motivations are different than those of party 
organizations. Practically, it means that super PACs are not absolute substitutes for political 
parties, as they do not pursue seat maximization motives. Complementary operations are referred 
to as operations that are not identical but are parallel to party committee operations. For this 
study, a super PAC complements the party organization when it pursues ideological motives. 
When a super PAC campaigns for a candidate based on ideological motives, it is performing a 
similar function as a party committee: electing a member of a particular party or ideology. 
However, because its motive is not to elect as many members of a particular party to Congress, it 
is working independently. 
 In all analyses, the independent expenditure records filed with the FEC were used as a 
measure of spending. This is a reliable measure of spending because, unlike other types of 
expenditures, all organizations must report independent expenditures to the FEC on a regular 
basis. All organizations must submit the purpose of the expenditure, the candidate for whom it is 
for or against, the amount, and the committee information. For my analysis, I excluded 
duplicative or edited entries (removing the original entry and keeping the alternate entry). I also 
consider independent expenditures a valid measure of spending for this purpose because of the 
nature of the debate around super PAC influence in elections and, more generally, money in 
politics. Whereas other types of campaign communications are not required to be disclosed to the 
FEC, independent expenditures provide a consistent measure of spending as they are easily 
tracked and disclosed by the FEC.  
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H1: Seat Maximization Hypothesis  
The first hypothesis addresses the relationship between super PACs and party 
committees. Whereas the literature clearly defines the party system as a resource allocation entity 
focused on preserving and gaining seats in each chamber, super PACs are free to pursue 
alternative motives, including influencing policy. Indeed, there have been several political 
organizations that were solely formed to advocate for or against congressional candidates that 
took a particular position on an issue, whether it was a woman’s right to choose, the Second 
Amendment, or environmental policies. I am interested in analyzing the total independent 
expenditures to see if the patterns found previously apply to all super PACs—are there 
significant relationships between organization types and the competitiveness of the district?   
In my model, ‘seat maximization motive’ is defined as the goal of the organization—
whether committee, party, or nonprofit—to win as many seats as possible in a given election. I 
find that political parties’ main goals include seat maximization, where their major motives 
during an election cycle are to educate voters on policies and positions in order to increase vote 
share, and thereby gaining seats. The first hypothesis states that super PACs do not pursue these 
same motives. Typical Political Action Committees (PACs) tend to pursue legislative strategies, 
where their main goals are access and influence in policymaking. Far fewer PACs pursue 
electoral strategy, where they seek to tip the partisan balance of Congress. The latter requires 
more resources—strategically spreading resources between a number of campaigns, particularly 
during election cycles in which there are many competitive races, may require more time and 
management than concentrating in a select number of races that may or may not be competitive. 
The most important investment considerations according to PAC managers are the candidate’s 
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proven effectiveness in policymaking, followed by electability. Least important was party 
affiliation—vastly different than the motives of political parties (Eismeier & Pollock III, 1985). 
 Similar to other PAC types, I hypothesize that super PACs do not pursue electoral 
motives in the form of seat maximization. Rather, they are more like traditional PACs in that 
they pursue more ideological motives and allocate their resources accordingly.  
 My measure of seat maximization motive in this study is the competitiveness of the 
district as measured by the Rothenberg Political Report’s chamber ratings (The Rothenberg 
Political Report, 2012). My assumption is that groups who are interested in seat maximization—
namely partisan political parties—rationally allocate their resources to those races that are most 
competitive, as competitive districts provide the most utility for investment—less competitive 
races provide substantially diminishing returns (Jacobson & Kernell, 1985-1986, Snyder, 1989). 
Organizations will not invest money in “safe” races, as the advantaged party has no incentive to 
increase vote share if they already have a majority, and the disadvantaged party has no incentive 
because “safe” races generally equate to large projected margins, few undecided voters, and a 
partisan electorate that will rarely change their vote. Therefore, resources are better spent in 
competitive districts where the vote margin is very slim and there may be a large number of 
either undecided or easily swung voters.   
 To test this hypothesis, I include three dependent variables: proportion of independent 
expenditure spending in each race that is made by a super PAC, the proportion of organizations 
that are designated as super PACs, and the dollars spent by super PACs in each race. These 
variables account not only for the amount of spending, but also address in which districts super 
PACs are the dominant organization. The first variable, proportion of spending by super PAC, 
inherently controls for district size and differences in spending. The variable was calculated by 
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dividing the dollars spent by super PACs by the total independent expenditure spending in the 
race. The second variable, proportion of super PAC organizations, was calculated by dividing the 
number of super PACs that participated in a given race by the total number of organizations that 
participated in that race.
1
 
The third variable, dollars spent by super PAC, is a summed dollar amount: the total 
spent by all super PACs in each race.
2
 For example, if super PAC X spent $75,000 in 
independent expenditures campaigning for Candidate A in Indiana’s 3rd District race, super PAC 
Y spent $25,000 in independent expenditures campaigning against Candidate A, and party 
committee D spent $125,000 in independent expenditures to elect Candidate A, the recorded 
amount would be $100,000, since that was the total amount of independent expenditure dollars 
spent by all super PACs in that race. The proportion variable in this example would be 0.44, or 
44%, since 44% of the independent expenditure spending in the district was spent by super 
PACs.  
A dummy variable for Senate races is included in the model as a control: I expect that 
House and Senate races will have different amounts of spending associated with them, as Senate 
races, on average, are more expensive and attract more outside money than House races (see 
Figure 1). Therefore, I must control for these different types of races. 
In order to measure seat maximization motives, I tested the competitiveness of the district 
on the output variables, proportion and amount of super PAC spending per race.  
                                                 
1
 I also modeled the proportion of super PAC spending in each district, where the total amount 
spent by super PACs in one district was divided by the total amount spent by super PACs in all 
districts. This allowed me to examine the characteristics of races that had the most super PAC 
involvement. The results were the same.  
 
2
 This variable was used to create a model that further illustrated the conclusions of the first two 
models. Where those provided proportions, this variable would provide a monetary value that 
would be easy to interpret.  
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H2: Ideological vs. Investment Motives 
 My second hypothesis illustrates the motives of super PACs. Whereas high-profile 
donors to political parties and candidate committees are often driven by investment motives, I 
hypothesize that super PACs are principally concerned with matching ideology. (Gordon, Hafer, 
& Landa, 2007) This addresses the overall research question in several ways: organizations that 
are purely ideological in their motivations would generally be more likely to contribute to riskier 
candidates, such as challengers, and may spend money in districts that have a more polarized 
political culture. This hypothesis has a number of potential implications, particularly for party 
polarization. Challengers and newcomers that have more extreme ideologies than the national 
party organization and that may have had to rely on the Hill committees pre-Citizens United 
could potentially be free to break from the party mold with support of ideological super PACs. 
No longer threatened by national party defunding, ideological extremists may be able to run a 
more competitive campaign with super PAC backing.   
 I measure ideology and investment in two ways: the presence of an incumbent and the 
polarization of the chamber at the state legislative level. Incumbency status was collected 
through FEC records and matched with the race and filtered into a dummy variable, with ‘0’ 
being an open seat and ‘1’ being the presence of an incumbent. Participating in open seat races is 
inherently more risky than advocating for an incumbent, particularly in competitive districts, and 
those organizations that pursue investment motives are concerned more with access than 
ideology. (Brunell, 2005) Therefore, if there is a relationship between spending by super PACs 
and open seat races, I conclude that super PACs are more risky in their behavior and are less 
likely to pursue access and investment motives.  
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 For polarization, I use the Ideological Mapping of American Legislatures (IMAL), an 
index created by Boris Shor of Georgetown University. The IMAL uses state legislative roll call 
data and responses to the Project Vote Smart National Political Awareness Test (NPAT), which 
is similar and supplementary to roll call data in that it asks politicians their positions on key 
policy issues including foreign policy and social issues (Shor & McCarty, 2011). Ideology scores 
were created for each member of a state’s legislature and combined to form state-level measures 
of ideology and polarization. 
Two measures of polarization were available: the distance between party medians by 
chamber (_diffs), and the average distance between any two members by chamber (_distance). 
For my analysis, I used the distance between party medians, where lower numbers indicate 
depolarization and higher numbers indicate high polarization, relative to the U.S. Congress mean 
of 1.2. For reference, California—the most polarized legislature in the model—has a 2.95 
ideology score, while the least polarized state in the model, Arkansas, has an ideology score of 
0.685. This means that in Senate chambers, for example, Arkansas Democrats are very close to 
Republicans on the conservative-liberal scale (whether Democrats in the state are slightly more 
conservative than the average Democrat or both parties are fairly moderate), but California 
Democrats and Republicans are at the extreme ends of the scale. The polarization index is 
important because in an extremely depolarized political climate, ideologies between candidates 
are very similar and therefore voters may be less apt to vote if they see no differences among two 
candidates.  
The candidate ideology scores were also available for use, where each candidate was 
ranked. While this would have given a more direct measure of the specific ideology of the 
candidate, there was no feasible way to create a district index for this study. Where most races 
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had two candidates, typically from opposing parties and therefore opposing ideologies, I could 
not find a way to combine scores into a single district score without losing the nuances of the 
rankings themselves. Therefore, the proxy measure of state legislative ideology must suffice for 
this study.  
I used these scores as an indicator of partisan polarization within the observed races. 
Though these are mappings of state-level legislatures, I felt these measures were appropriate for 
determining the overall polarization of the state and provided useful insights on the state’s 
political climate particularly when it came to voting in the 2012 election. As Shor noted in his 
data supplement, “in the aggregate, state legislative medians correlate highly with voter ideology 
measures” (Shor & McCarty, 2011). Several chambers did not have updated estimates included 
in the July 2014 release, so the last available estimate was used (typically 2010, the previous year 
in which the data was available). By using these measures of state-level polarization, I was able 
to get a sense of political tides and overall mood during the election.  
I employed the measure of state ideology in several ways: a significant, downward linear 
relationship between super PACs and ideological measures would indicate that these 
organizations are primarily concerned with ideological motives, while an upward relationship or 
no relationship would indicate that they pursue access motives. I would expect to see an upward 
parabolic line in races where super PACs invested more in races in extremely polarized and 
extremely depolarized states and less in moderately polarized states when they are driven by 
ideology, as races in both extremely polarized and depolarized states would produce 
ideologically extreme candidates. In a polarized state, there tend to be fewer undecided voters, 
and therefore extreme candidates may emerge to attract and energize the party’s base. In a 
depolarized state, there is little ideological difference between the two parties: in a depolarized 
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Republican state, for example, Democratic candidates are more conservative than average, and 
some may be more conservative than other Republicans in other states. The political nature of 
these states attracts ideologically extreme candidates, particularly in the ideology in which the 
state leans. A reliably red state like Kansas, for instance, has become a microcosm of the Tea 
Party, for many Kansas residents—including Kansas moderates and Democrats—are more 
conservative than the national average. An interest in supporting an ideologically extreme 
candidate has less potential for policy payoff, as the chambers tend to be more moderate due to 
moderate state climates and the existence of party establishments.  
H3: Independent and Complimentary Operations 
 The final hypothesis states that super PACs operate independently yet complimentary to 
party committees. Using the analyses from the first two hypotheses, I combined them to explore 
the ramifications of the findings. If the hypotheses are both supported—that is, if super PACs do 
not pursue seat maximization but do pursue ideological motives—it would support my third 
hypothesis and I could conclude that super PACs are a part of the party system. However, if 
either of my hypotheses is not supported, then I conclude that super PACs are emerging as a 
substitute for or in competition to the party system. If the organizations pursue seat maximization 
strategies, several scenarios are possible: they draw money away from the party organization, 
they support and prioritize issues that parties, donors, or the general public find unfeasible or 
dissatisfactory, or they attempt to push the ideology of the party’s members to one extreme or the 
other. Likewise, if super PACs follow investment motives rather than ideological motives—as 
measured by the IMAP—I can conclude that they are self-acting, are not concerned with the 
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ideological makeup of the chamber, and are independent of the party. The analysis from the first 





Chapter 6:  Methods and Analysis 
 Standard OLS regression models were used for all hypotheses. I used Microsoft Excel for 
cleaning and summarizing the data and JMP Pro 11 for the modeling. Races were combined by 
state or district, totaling 315 total observations—this includes all types of committees in both 
types of races. Partial t-tests were used for standards of statistical significance, and residual 
plotting and scatterplots were used to analyze goodness of fit. The alpha level for all tests is 
α≤0.05 unless stated otherwise.  
H1 & H2: Drivers of Spending 
 In this analysis, I tested my first two hypotheses in the same regression model. I have 
three separate models, one for each dependent variable—proportion of super PAC organizations 
as compared to total number of organizations, proportion of super PAC spending compared to 
total spending, and the dollar amount of super PAC spending in the race. My independent 
variables, Rothenberg Rating Index, incumbency status, and Ideological Mapping index (IMAL), 
were included in each model as well as the control for the race type. Models are included in 









Table 7: OLS Model of Rothenberg Rating Index, Incumbency Status, and Polarization 
Index, 2012 
 Proportion SP 
Spending 
Proportion SP 
Organizations $ Spent by Super PACs 
β0 0.398 (0.081)* 0.411(0.059)* 2,955,152.00 (372,901.90)* 
Rothenberg Rating -0.114 (0.005)* -0.019 (0.004)* -278,137.00 (24,694.04)* 
Incumbency Status -0.099 (0.054) -0.042 (0.039) -5,664.76 (248164.40) 
Polarization -0.032 (0.029) -0.026 (0.021) 141,733.51 (133012.20) 
Senate (control) 0.236 (0.063)* 0.244 (0.046)* 2,629,993.40 (289754.50)* 
R
2
 0.072 0.17 0.44 
Proportion SP Spending refers to the proportion of total independent expenditure spending 
in each race spent by a super PAC throughout the entire general election cycle. 
Proportion SP Organizations refers to the proportion of total organizations that 
participated in each race that were super PACs throughout the entire general election cycle. 
$ Spent by Super PACs refers to the total dollar amount of independent expenditures spent 
by super PACs in each race throughout the entire general election cycle. 
Rothenberg Rating refers to the competitiveness index created from the Rothenberg 
Ratings to capture the competitiveness of the race throughout the general election cycle.  
Incumbency Status refers to the status of the race, where 0 indicates an open race and 1 
indicates the presence of an incumbent running for reelection. 
Polarization refers to the index used to measure the ideological difference between two 
parties in the state legislature as an indicator of overall state polarization, where 0 indicates 
total depolarization and zero difference between the two parties and 3.5 indicates severe 
polarization. 
Sources: Federal Election Commission, 2014a, The Rothenberg Political Report, 2012, 
Shor & McCarty, 2011 
 
 The model shows that there is a significant linear relationship between super PAC 
participation in a district and the competitiveness of the district as measured by the Rothenberg 
Rating Index. In the average district, 39.8% of the spending in a district is made by super PACs, 
while 41.1% of the organizations that participate in the race are super PACs. This means that if 
10 organizations are campaigning in a single race—whether for a House or Senate seat—4 of 




All else equal, for each one-point increase in the Rothenberg index, both the proportion 
of participation and the dollar amount of spending decrease. For each unit increase in the index, 
the proportion of spending accounted for by super PACs decreases by 0.114, or 11.4%. For each 
unit increase in the index, the proportion of super PACs as organizations decreased 0.019, or 
about 2%. This decrease was less substantial than the decrease in the proportional spending, 
which may suggest several scenarios: super PACs may be willing to participate in safer races but 
don’t spend as much as they would if the race were more competitive, or other types of 
organizations—including party committees and political nonprofit organizations—may spend 
more money in the race than they would have had the race been more competitive. To find out 
which scenario is correct, I look at the third model.  
When looking at the third model—the total dollar amount spent by a super PAC in a 
district—I find that for each unit increase in Rothenberg index, there is a $278,137 decrease in 
the amount spent by super PACs. This is equivalent to a 9.4% decrease in dollars spent for each 
increase in Rothenberg index, meaning that of the two scenarios, the first seems more plausible. 
The proportion of super PACs as organization type decreases slightly, meaning other types of 
organizations enter the race and some super PACs leave the race as it gets less competitive, 
while the proportion and dollar amount of money spent decreases substantially. This suggests 
that there is a significant, positive relationship between money spent by super PACs and 
competitiveness of the race. As a visual aid, a scatterplot depicting the relationship between the 





Figure 4: Linear Relationship between Super PAC Spending and Rothenberg Rating Index 
 
Note 1: Model is Significant at p<0.001 
Y Axis (SPspend): Dollar amount of super PAC spending in each race 
X axis (rothrating): Rothenberg Rating Index as a measure of competitiveness across the general 
election cycle, where 0 indicates a very competitive race throughout the weeks included in the 
index (tossup) and 12 indicates a safe race throughout the weeks included in the index.  
Sources: Federal Election Commission, 2014a, The Rothenberg Political Report, 2012 
 
I find from the models that there is no significant relationship between either incumbency 
status or polarization index and super PAC spending. This is an interesting finding, and I 
therefore fail to reject my null hypothesis. There appears to be no significant linear relationship 
between the characteristics of the district signifying ideological motivations and super PAC 
participation in the district.  
Alternative Models 
 I find that in the original model, there is no significant relationship between ideology 
index of the district or state and super PAC participation. However, the literature suggests that 
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outside organizations are often interested in the general mood of the races and the political 
climate of the area, so further research is warranted.   
 In refitting my model, I find a nonlinear relationship between super PAC participation 
and polarization of the district or state. I expected to find this relationship because of the general 
design of the variable, as the scale is curved: on the 0-3.5 scale, 1.5 indicates party median, while 
0 and 3.5 indicate extreme political climates, whether they are polarized or depolarized.  
 When I refit the data, I find a significant quadratic relationship between super PAC 
participation and polarization index. Figure 5 illustrates the models: the green line being the 

















Figure 5: Quadratic Relationship, Proportion of Super PAC Participation and Ideology 
Index 
 
Note 2: Model is Significant at p<0.00 
Y Axis (propSPorgs): Proportion of total count of organizations participating in given race that 
are designated as super PACs by the Federal Election Commission.  
X Axis (imal): Polarization index used to measure the ideological difference between two parties 
in the state legislature as an indicator of overall state polarization, where 0 indicates total 
depolarization and zero difference between the two parties and 3.5 indicates severe polarization. 
Sources: Federal Election Commission, 2014a, Shor & McCarty, 2011 
 
This model does not account for race type. However, the model is still telling: the 
proportion of super PACs as organization type decreases in the most polarized districts. The 
model suggests that super PACs are more interested than other types of groups to participate in 
races in less polarized states, and tend to hold back from moderately polarized political climates.  
 A very similar pattern is found in the proportion of spending: the upward parabola 
suggests that super PACs spend proportionally more than other types of organizations in 
depolarized districts and slightly more in heavily polarized districts, as shown in Figure 6.  
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Figure 6: Quadratic Relationship between Proportion of Super PAC Spending and 
Ideology Index 
 
Note 3: Model is Significant at p<.001 
Y Axis (propSPspend): Proportion of total independent expenditure spending in a given race that 
was spent by super PACs as designated by the Federal Election Commission.  
X Axis (imal): Polarization index used to measure the ideological difference between two parties 
in the state legislature as an indicator of overall state polarization, where 0 indicates total 
depolarization and zero difference between the two parties and 3.5 indicates severe polarization. 
Sources: Federal Election Commission, 2014a, Shor & McCarty, 2011 
 
These findings support my hypothesis: super PACs, on average, pursue ideological rather 
than investment motives. Their concern with ideology rather than access is shown in the figures: 
organizations interested in access typically campaign for those candidates who can work with a 
majority once in the chamber to pass legislation, whereas those interested in ideology are more 
concerned with the policy positions of the candidate before he or she is sworn in.  
H3: Independent and Complimentary Operations 
 Using my previous analyses, I found that there were significant relationships between 
total expenditures in a given race and the competitiveness of the race, but no significant 
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relationships between expenditures and incumbency status among super PACs. I did, however, 
find a significant, quadratic relationship between super PAC spending and state ideology scores. 
These committees were more likely to support candidates in ideologically-extreme states, and are 
less likely to support candidates in safe districts.   
 These findings come together to lend credibility to my final hypothesis. Super PACs 
seem to work in collaboration with the party system, participating in races that are competitive, 
yet allocating their funds into different types of races. Whereas party committees tend to spend 
money in those districts and states that may lean toward one party or another (presumably to 
energize their bases in Get Out the Vote efforts and other canvassing strategies), therefore 
maximizing their resources on races they are likely to win, super PACs step in and campaign for 
candidates in purely tossup races and in ideologically extreme districts.  
These strategies are high risk, yet high reward. They are high risk for the committee, as 
campaigning on behalf of candidates who are more extreme than the average Congressman may 
be longshot candidates and the committee risks spending money without electoral payoff. 
However, the payoff would be large: in the long run, it may create a more partisan Congress.  
Study Limitations 
 This analysis has several known limitations. First, it is not a longitudinal study and 
therefore the models cannot imply causation between variables. This study was an intensive look 
at the relationships between super PACs, parties, and districts in the 2012 congressional election 
cycle alone. I attempted to capture variations in some variables, particularly competitiveness, by 
creating a time sensitive index using ratings from three different points in time. However, while 
it was possible to detect competitiveness shifts, the index was unable to give more nuanced 
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details regarding the differences: the magnitude and direction of the movement was lost in the 
index. However, a full time analysis was out of the scope of the study.  All findings may not be 
generalizable to later elections, but this study’s findings may help inform future students of 
campaign finance of general patterns in this election.  
 Secondly, expenditure, candidate, and committee data were collected directly from the 
Federal Election Commission’s website. There were several known errors in the data 
transcription likely due to human error when entering the information, and I did my best to 
resolve those issues. However, due to the magnitude of entries and nature of the entries, there 
may have been unresolved problems in single entries. I am confident that any errors did not 
substantially alter my findings or models.  
 I was also limited in my modeling. While OLS regression modeling has been widely used 
in the social sciences, there may have been other types of statistical analyses performed that 
would better fit the data. However, without extended training in quantitative analysis, other 
model types—including higher-order polynomial modeling and fixed effects modeling—is out of 
the scope of this study. I feel OLS modeling is a sufficient resource for this type of study, as my 
models appeared to generally fit the data well. However, there remains room for improvement, 
whether it be from a different model or an omitted parameter. Most obvious were the dummy 
variables for controlling for incumbency and race type. Lesser known were my assumptions 
surrounding the independence of the observations: my model did not account for any collinearity 
between variables. I attempted to address these potential problems through statistical analysis but 
was limited by my statistical training. Additionally, I was unable to fully analyze the third 
hypothesis due to time restrictions.  
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 Finally, my variables make several important assumptions. While the hypotheses were 
formed based on the literature, some methodology was unavailable for some rankings, 
particularly the competitiveness ranking. The Rothenberg Rating Index, while a widely-respected 
model, relies heavily on qualitative assessments of individual races. My dependent variables 
account only for independent expenditures, and do not count other types of election funding, 
including candidate contributions and electioneering communications. My measures of 
ideological motives—incumbency and polarization—are imperfect proxies. They capture state-
level data, which I projected onto specific congressional districts. This may be a severe 
limitation, since there is typically wide variation between congressional districts. Had I more 





Chapter 7: Discussion and Conclusion 
 Will Marshall, in his editorial for POLITICO magazine, implied that super PACs and the 
new era of campaign finance would be detrimental to the political process. Large, well-funded 
organizations that were legally allowed to campaign for—or more often against—candidates for 
elected office would be the downfall of American elections. This study aimed to find the role of 
super PACs in the 2012 congressional election cycle, paying particular attention to the district 
characteristics in an attempt to understand their resource allocation strategies. I found that super 
PACs appeared to act in concert with party organizations: participating in competitive districts, 
but not typically the same ones as parties. Super PACs appeared to act as ‘safety-net’ 
contributors. Vulnerable candidates who were not deemed winnable or a priority by the party 
found support in these groups. Likewise, they appeared to follow mostly ideological motives 
rather than investment motives, suggesting that super PACs were more interested in electing 
like-minded candidates rather than electing malleable candidates for the expectation of potential 
policy payoff.   
  Using Federal Election Commission records, I analyzed the overall trends in the data. I 
used ordinary least squares regression models to test significance of relationships between super 
PAC participation in districts, as measured by the proportion of expenditures and organization 
counts, as well as direct dollar figures of expenditures in each race, and several variables: 
competitiveness of the district, as measured by an index created from the Rothenberg Political 




 Super PACs, in the 2012 general election cycle, spent more than any other type of 
organization. Parties tended to allocate their resources into the chamber they were expected to 
keep or hold: Democrats funneled more resources into Senate races, while Republicans spent 
more resources in House races. Super PACs, on the other hand, did the opposite: as a whole, they 
spent more money in support of House Democrats and Senate Republicans. This further suggests 
that parties, while allocating resources rationally to the races they are most likely to win or 
defending vulnerable seats, traditionally left potentially winnable seats to the other party, but in 
this cycle super PACs appeared to assist parties in participating in those races that were left 
behind.  
 My three hypotheses were supported by the data: super PACs were less motivated by seat 
maximization concerns than parties, they are principally concerned with ideological rather than 
investment motives and they operate independently yet complementary to party committees. 
While super PAC participation was significantly related to race competitiveness, it was not 
associated with the most competitive races, as party committee participation was. In addition, 
super PACs tended to participate in less polarized districts, whereas other groups tended to 
participate in moderately- and higher-polarized races. Higher rates of polarization typically result 
in a more responsive electorate because there is a clear choice between the two candidates; less 
polarized districts typically have candidates that are very similar, and voters cannot often tell the 
difference between the two. This sometimes leads to complacency among voters. Parties and 
traditional PACs tend to participate in more polarized districts, since voters are more responsive 
to campaigning tactics. 
 It is important to note that this study includes data from only one election cycle. It is 
highly possible that because these organizations are so new, they are simply experimenting with 
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various campaign strategies and the resource allocation methods may change substantially as a 
result of changing political landscapes and campaign finance regulations. Since the 2010 
Supreme Court rulings, the Court further weakened other aspects of campaign finance regulation 
in McCutcheon, et al v. FEC, striking down the contribution limits to candidates, parties, and 
political action committees (Federal Election Commission, 2014b). Where donors were limited 
in the amount per year they could give to various political entities, they no longer are restricted, 
though there are still limits on the amount an individual can give to each candidate, PAC, or 
party committee. Similarly, more research is warranted regarding the donors of these 
organizations: are there new participants, or are super PACs just another way for the same people 
to participate in elections?  
 This study is important because it provides a preliminary study of super PAC behavior. I 
think that despite the changes and analysts’ assertions of the decline of the party organization, 
the two-party system will maintain a strong presence in American politics. If the above assertion 
proves to be true and the super PAC is simply an easier way for the same players to get involved 
in politics rather than additional donors bringing more money into the system, I don’t believe 
that they will become a primary vehicle for campaign communications. The weakening of 
campaign finance laws in McCutcheon and the vows of some elected officials to further break 
down the laws may eliminate the need for super PACs, as the Court appears to be treating money 
as speech and eliminating all restrictions for contributions for the sake of the First Amendment. 
However, if some laws are upheld, super PACs may become dominant avenues for participation, 
particularly for their appeal in accepting nonprofit money and masking donor information.  
 In conclusion, the three hypotheses culminated to suggest several main findings. First, 
super PACs appear to be extensions of the party system rather than a replacement of it. They 
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participate generally in the races that may not have the most payoff: less competitive races with 
less involved voters. Also, these organizations are more concerned with ideological rather than 
policy payoff motives. The latter finding should bring a relative ease to critics of these groups: 
direct policy favors do not appear to be a driver of super PAC spending. Rather, super PACs are 
driven by the interests and preferences of their donors. This finding in itself may be alarming, as 
the donors for these organizations are often wealthy political elites. The majority of messages 
outside spending creates reflects not the preferences of the general electorate, but of a 
concentrated number of Americans. Further study is warranted to determine whether the patterns 
found in this study are enduring, or whether super PACs will evolve with different strategies 
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